REVIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN 1987 AND THE CANADIAN RESPONSE

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PREFACE

The legislation which created the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security in 1984 states that "the purpose of the Institute is to increase knowledge and understanding of the issues relating to international peace and security from a Canadian perspective, with particular emphasis on arms control, disarmament, defence and conflict resolution." An annual review of peace and security issues, and the Canadian response to them, will, we think, contribute to and encourage public discussion and thereby help to increase knowledge and understanding.

This first review was written by Geoffrey Pearson, Executive Director of the Institute. The Institute's Board of Directors saw the paper in advance, and while some offered comment, the judgements and conclusions of the paper are those of the author.

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Introduction

1987 was in many ways a watershed year for the prospects of improved international security, especially at the super-power level. The agreement in December to eliminate intermediate-range missiles (INF), was the culmination of a process begun in 1979 and given shape two years later as the "zero option." In addition there was progress on other arms control issues, including negotiations for a reduction in strategic missiles, a ban on chemical weapons, and the placing of further limits on nuclear testing; and there were also indications at the end of the year that substantive negotiations might finally begin on force reductions in Europe. Moreover, the peace process in Central America was continuing, despite formidable opposition, and an agreement to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan was closer than ever before.

On the other hand, conflicts in Africa continued to frustrate efforts to improve grim conditions of poverty and starvation, especially in Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia, and little movement was registered by the UN and others in their effort to end war between Iran and Iraq, or to bring about a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute. Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka underlined the fact that domestic conflict can be as great a threat to peace as international conflict. Yet such internal conflict appears likely to become widespread as population pressures exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions in much of Asia and Africa. These tensions in turn lead governments to increase spending on arms, which is now approaching a trillion US dollars annually or about six

percent of the world GNP. Moreover, the UN estimate of "official" refugees in the world has reached twelve million.

If this stocktaking contains positive as well as negative elements, such cannot be said for the economic, social and ecological indications of world development. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are likely to increase assistance to the world's poor, if current projections for their economies are valid. Rather they will concentrate on "re-structuring" their own declining levels of productivity and savings. Others, including Canada, will have to do more. Meanwhile, Third World debt is reaching unsustainable levels, commodity prices remain depressed, and a number of countries are sinking into greater poverty. Poverty in turn leads to destruction of the natural environment, as the Brundtland Report on the environment pointed out.

It is no longer possible, if it ever was, to divide threats to security into political, military and economic categories. Arms control, for example, is a legitimate process in itself, especially as it applies to nuclear weapons which clearly must be controlled if they cannot be abolished, but it is no guarantee of "stability" in a world of increasing disparities between states, peoples and individuals.

The Government has described Canadian foreign policy as one of "active internationalism." A higher priority is to be given to human rights, including an apparent willingness to take the Commonwealth lead in dealing with the problems of southern Africa. In addition, the Government is pledged to increase its military contribution to NATO; Canada has assumed a higher profile at the United Nations, especially in respect of human rights; and the Canadian contribution to research on the verification of arms control treaties has reached significant proportions. On the other hand, the new focus on

sovereignty control and defence in the North has not yet been accompanied by an international strategy for Arctic co-operation. If polls are to be believed, the public appears to support both a more nationalist defence policy and a more internationalist foreign policy.

1) Superpower Relations

The Washington Summit meeting in December was undoubtedly the highest point in US/Soviet relations since the signing of the SALT Treaty in 1979. The change in the Soviet leadership in 1985, and subsequent changes in Soviet policies since, were a principal factor in this warming of relations, although the American leadership would perhaps have sought to improve these relations anyway. Yet it should not be thought that the trend of events is bound to be positive. Deep divisions remain, based on rival interests and values. These can be managed if each side follows the INF example to seek security through verifiable agreements rather than unilateral advantage. But if "imperialism" on the one hand and "communist hegemony" on the other are said to be the "real" threat, then all agreements become hostage to unpredictable events which can be interpreted to mean that nothing has changed and that superior military strength is the only safeguard. The current negotiations on strategic arms will put these contrasting approaches to a severe test.

2) Arms Control and Disarmament

Introduction

Canada generally votes on these issues at the United Nations with a group of "middle power" friends, including Japan, Australia, Norway, the Netherlands and West Germany. This puts us safely in the "middle" of the debate as well. We

have taken a lead on the issue of verification but otherwise have been content to vote with most of our NATO allies against Resolutions which run contrary to NATO policies, such as a freeze on nuclear weapons or the prohibition of their use. However, the Government has not hesitated to object to American policies which appear to threaten East/West stability. These include the development of strategic defences beyond certain limits and exceeding the limits on strategic weapons set by SALT II.

a) Nuclear and Space Arms

In early 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate simultaneously on three classes of nuclear weapons: long range or strategic weapons, space weapons, and intermediate range weapons (between 1,000 and 5,500 kms). The signature of the INF Treaty on 8 December 1987, was the first fruit of these negotiations and appeared to augur well for the prospects of agreement on the two other classes of weapons. Throughout the talks the Soviet side made important concessions, agreeing finally not only to a separate treaty on intermediate range weapons, in which they had an advantage of almost four to one, but to the global elimination of all such weapons, including those of shorter range (between 500 and 1,000 kms). In addition, they accepted stringent provisions for on-site inspection, which no one had expected they would do when the talks began. It should be remembered, however, that thousands of short-range nuclear weapons remain in Europe and that these are not the subject of the current negotiations.

The joint statement issued at the end of the Superpower Summit in December noted that "considerable progress" had been made towards the conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, implementing the principle of 50 percent reductions, and

it expressed confidence that such a treaty would be signed before the end of June 1988. The statement contained detailed instructions on the "priority tasks" of the follow-up negotiations. However, no agreement was reached on the limits which the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 imposes on the development of defensive or "space" weapons, an agreement which Mr. Gorbachev said on his return to Moscow was a condition of any 50 percent cut in offensive weapons.

The meaning of the ABM Treaty is not the only obstacle to a second agreement on reducing nuclear weapons. Questions of verification, especially of sea-launched cruise missiles, remain to be answered. Nor can one assume that the issue of "linkage," especially to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, will not again be raised. However, on the whole, the negotiations appear to have received a political impetus that will be hard to stop. Certainly the NATO allies of the United States, including Canada, attach the highest priority to the substantial reduction of strategic offensive arms, and they believe that a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty is important to achieving such reductions.

These negotiations have important implications for Canada. Unlike the INF Treaty, which does not affect Canada directly, an agreement reducing the numbers of ballistic missiles might give new importance to long range cruise missiles carried by aircraft and submarines. If these approach Canadian territory and if we are to exercise adequate control over such territory, we shall need to respond. On the other hand, the failure of the negotiations would focus new attention on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the testing of which might well require Canadian co-operation at some future point. In both cases the government would be likely to face deep political divisions as well as new defence costs. It would be in the Canadian interest, therefore, that

measures for strictly limiting the number of air and sea-launched cruise missiles and for restricting the deployment of cruise missile platforms be agreed at Geneva.

b) Chemical Weapons

The second arms control priority for the NATO allies is the abolition of chemical weapons. In 1984, when the United States presented a draft treaty on chemical weapons with extraordinarily demanding verification provisions (mandatory on-site inspection, anytime, anywhere), there appeared little chance that the Soviets would respond in any way adequate to meet US concerns. Since then, the Soviets have shifted position and a treaty to ban the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons may be within the grasp of the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1988 session. The United States has resumed production of chemical weapons and other countries may be acquiring a capacity to produce them, so the matter is urgent. A new Canadian study on the organization of a chemical weapons verification regime will be of help to this negotiating process.

c) Comprehensive Test Ban

A comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests must now be considered a distant prospect. In this case the search for adequate verification is not the central problem. Although questions remain about the difficulties of verifying a comprehensive test ban, there is little doubt about the feasibility of banning all but the smallest nuclear tests and Soviet/American talks on the subject are continuing. But the Reagan Administration has made it clear that it sees nuclear testing as essential to the maintenance of deterrence and that testing will be required as long as nuclear weapons are deployed.

In this situation the long-standing Canadian objective of a total ban needs to be re-considered. Is such an objective likely to facilitate or impede agreement on interim steps which reduce the size and number of tests? In any case, it will be necessary to gather greater support for the international verification arrangements which would facilitate an early ban on all but the smallest nuclear explosions, while at the same time seeking to persuade the United States to accept them.

d) Force Reductions in Europe

Progress in arms control at the nuclear level has evoked renewed interest in the conventional forces arrayed on both sides in Western Europe. Reducing nuclear armaments, not surprisingly, has led NATO commanders to call for greater commitments by the Allies to match the conventional strength of the Warsaw Pact countries. Although the conventional force balance may require increased levels of forces in Europe, as the Government has recognized, there are signs of another approach which holds out greater hope than at any time in the past decade.

In the flurry of Soviet pronouncements on arms control and security in Europe, two proposals stand out. First, Gorbachev has recognized that conventional arms reductions may need to be asymmetrical, and Soviet spokesman have hinted that Soviet tank armies might be a prime candidate for such reductions. Second, the Soviets have indicated a willingness to accept wide-ranging measures to verify an arms reduction agreement.

As the two sides move towards a new round of talks, these prospective changes in the Soviet approach offer both

opportunity and challenge to the members of NATO. The opportunity is to achieve significant force reductions in Europe, without which it is difficult to contemplate any meaningful solution to the East/West tensions. The challenge is to reach an Alliance agreement about the minimal force levels which would leave all of Europe more secure.

1988 will probably also see a reconvening of the thirty-five nation negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe, with a mandate to develop further the CSBMs already agreed. NATO participants will then have to decide the extent to which they should accept measures that would constrain their normal peacetime military activities.

These two sets of negotiations will be long and tedious in their complexity, but on their success depends the long-term prospects for any significant reduction of tensions in Europe. Canada's influence in these arms control discussions will depend more on the quality of its proposals than the size of its standing army. In particular, in the field of satellite verification, Canada is in a strong position to put constructive proposals to our allies.

e) Disarmament and Development

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament and Development, held in New York in August, led to a fragile consensus on the issues at stake. The linkage was examined in a number of ways, and it was agreed that the critical factor in reducing world military spending, now 20 times greater than development assistance, is enhanced security in all its aspects, both military and non-military.

The Conference adopted an "action programme" which commits governments to "consider" such measures as reducing

military spending, allocating savings to humanitarian relief, studying conversion of military industry and publicizing military budgets. But significantly almost nothing is said about the spread of sophisticated weapons, including ballistic missiles, around the world. In this regard, the Government should consider making more information available about Canadian exports of arms, partly in order to dissipate public confusion, but also in order to be in a position to explore the possibilities of breaking the conspiracy of silence on this issue at the UN.

3) Regional Conflict

Introduction

A review of this length cannot usefully survey the twenty or more conflicts in which troops are involved around the world. Those of major concern to Canada are described below. Canadian policy has traditionally been, and remains, to support United Nations and regional efforts to bring about the settlement of such disputes through the provision of assistance for peacekeeping, where appropriate, and for the needs of refugees and the alleviation of famine. Canadian soldiers serving the UN number about 1,000, a slight increase over 1986; they are stationed principally in Cyprus and on the Israel/Syria border. Some 21,000 legal refugees reached Canada during the year, and perhaps as many arrived illegally. Fifteen percent of Canada's official development aid goes towards food.

a) Central America

At the beginning of 1987 the Contadora process, an initiative launched in 1983 by Mexico, Panama, Colombia and

Venezuela to find a regional solution to the civil wars of Central America, appeared to be no nearer to success than before. Conflict in Nicaragua was in fact increasing. The investigation of US arms sales to Iran and the revelation that profits had been diverted to the contras in Nicaragua demonstrated that at least some White House officials were determined to go to great lengths to bring down the government of Nicaragua. The latter in turn was not prepared to negotiate with its enemies, although it had accepted provisions of the Contadora Plan that would have prevented it from interfering in the affairs of its neighbours.

A new plan for ending the conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala was agreed to by all five Central American Governments in August. The complex provisions of this agreement, which had been proposed by Costa Rica, were still being worked out at year's end! They included arrangements for dialogue between governments and opponents in all five countries. A key to any solution was bound to be the question of whether United States military aid to the contras would be resumed, and this was likely to depend in turn on perceptions in Congress of the good faith of the Sandinista government in carrying out the terms of the Five Power Agreement.

Canadians have shown unusual interest in these matters--unusual because Central America had not, until recently, ranked high in Canadian policy priorities. The 40 year dictatorship of Somoza in Nicaragua, for example, never attracted much Canadian interest or even concern. Public attention began to focus on the region in 1979 with the overthrow of Somoza, followed in 1980 by the election of President Reagan and the extraordinary importance he attached to the presence in Central America of a government apparently allied to the Soviet Union. As the level of violence in the

region increased, so too did public concern in Canada. In 1985 it resulted in the submission of more briefs on Central America to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations than on any other subject. It is noteworthy as well, however, that the Committee was unable to agree on what, if anything, Canada might do about the situation except to maintain assistance for refugees, of which Canada has accepted about 16,000 since 1980, continue official development assistance (except to Guatemala) and support the Contadora process.

Since 1986, when the Committee reported, Canada has increased its aid to the region (this now includes Guatemala), maintained its level of support for refugees, held detailed discussions with local governments on the conditions for successful peace-keeping without formally offering to participate, and reiterated its criticism of outside intervention in Central America. Mr. Clark's visit to the region in November was important as a symbolic demonstration of these interests, but it did not lead to the changes in policy that his critics advocate. These include the public condemnation of US aid to the <u>contras</u>, greater commitment to the peacekeeping provisions of the Arias Peace Plan, and the attaching of stricter conditions to Canadian development assistance, especially to Guatemala and El Salvador. Such views reflect a growing disenchantment with US policies, but they also recall a traditional dilemma for Canadian governments: how far should they go, and how publicly, in disassociating Canada from US action that endorses or implies the use of force against small states? The case of Vietnam comes to mind. Officials generally argue that quiet diplomacy works best. But in the nature of things, the evidence for this assumption is not available and it can only be expected to satisfy the critics if US policy in fact changes.

A second dilemma concerns the evaluation of violations of human rights. The Government suspended its aid programme to Guatemala on the grounds that violations of human rights there caused such security problems that development aid could not be delivered effectively. It has been resumed on the grounds that this is no longer the case, a judgement disputed by some observers, although Canadian NGO's have continued to work in Guatemala. Unfortunately, there is no independent or impartial standard by which to judge such matters: the UN Commission on Human Rights is inevitably hampered by political differences in coming to agreed conclusions. For this reason, it is to be hoped that the new Institute for the study and promotion of human rights which the Government intends to establish will help Canadians to reach a better understanding of the issues at stake.

At a deeper level, Canadian and US assessments of threats to peace outside of Europe are based on different perceptions of what world order requires. The United States tends to perceive events in terms of the poles of "communism" or the "Soviet Empire" and the "free world," and it expects its allies to rally to the cause; Canadian governments, on the other hand, are more sensitive to the local and indigenous circumstances of any conflict and look to international law and organization, or to regional mechanisms, as the appropriate vehicles for response. Canada does not regard the conflicts in Central America as manifestations of the Cold War but rather as the product of injustice, poverty and corruption.

By and large, these assumptions are shared by US allies, although they are tempered by doubts about Soviet policies, doubts which are based as much on the rhetoric, as on the practice, of successive Soviet leaders. The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev is helping to calm such doubts; and while Canada and

other allies of the United States will probably prefer, for the time being, to seek change in Central America by more discreet means than the outright condemnation of aid to the contras, much will depend in future on how they interpret the evolution of "democracy" in Central America. The Canadian government will have to make up its mind on this issue if fighting continues, for it will not long suffice simply to deplore outside intervention in these countries without distinguishing between the kinds of intervention that are taking place.

b) Southern Africa

Conflict in and around South Africa in no way diminished during 1987. In November South Africa admitted that its forces were in action in Angola, and if they were not actually stationed in Mozambique, they appeared to be supporting the rebel forces there. The activities of the latter were a principal cause of the conditions of famine in that country. Other frontline states were less affected by war and famine, but all suffered from a geo-strategic situation which left them economically dependent and militarily vulnerable. In South Africa itself there was no sign of any genuine negotiations between the Government and the black majority. The Commonwealth heads of government, meeting in Canada in October, "were compelled to acknowledge that the crisis engendered in the region by apartheid has seriously deteriorated since our last meeting" (in 1985).

Canada has taken a lead in these matters. Prime Minister Mulroney visited Zimbabwe and Zambia in early 1987, and Mr. Clark followed up later in the year with visits to Mozambique and South Africa itself. The leader of the African National Congress (ANC), Oliver Tambo, met with Mr. Mulroney in Ottawa. Canada also took the lead in forging a consensus of

Commonwealth leaders (except for Britain) in October that "efforts should be made to secure the universal adoption of the measures now adopted by most Commonwealth and other countries," and that "an enhanced programme of co-ordinated Commonwealth assistance" should be made to the region, especially to Mozambique. Mr. Clark was asked to chair a group of Commonwealth foreign ministers to further these and other objectives. Finally, Canada has acted on all of the sanctions actually recommended by the Commonwealth heads of government, has reduced its imports from that country by over 50 percent, and is committed to increase its aid to the frontline states.

It is not yet clear how sanctions are to be "intensified" and Mr. Clark has been careful not to commit Canada to take any new action, except in concert with other Commonwealth countries. He has spoken of using Canada's influence to build a consensus rather than "acting dramatically," but the question remains whether a consensus which excludes Britain will make any difference to South Africa's policies. Moreover, US and European Economic Community (EEC) action in this respect appears to have flagged. The Government is therefore wise to move cautiously, although in view of its previous statements, which have suggested that further sanctions will be imposed if the South African government refuses to initiate genuine negotiations with the black majority, the time is bound to come soon when decisions will have to be made, consensus or no consensus.

More development aid to the frontline states is certainly desirable, but it is doubtful that in the short term at least they can rid themselves of trade dependence on South Africa. Given its other aid commitments around the world, and especially in the rest of Africa, there are also severe limits on Canada's capacity to give significantly increased help.

Other prospective donors are in no better position. It would therefore appear that the situation in and around South Africa will continue to frustrate efforts at amelioration from outside, unless and until the West agrees with the vast majority of UN members to impose mandatory sanctions. Even then, there can be no guarantee that positive change will follow.

c) Iran & Iraq

In 1987 the war between Iraq and Iran threatened to include the Gulf states, despite passage of an unanimous resolution by the Security Council on 20 July "demanding" an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces to "the internationally recognized boundaries," requesting the Secretary-General inter alia to confirm and supervise these actions, and deciding to meet again "as necessary" to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the resolution. Iraq accepted this resolution. Iran has refused to do so, unless Iraq is first declared the aggressor in the war. On 10 December the Secretary-General told the Council that his efforts to implement the resolution had failed, and he implied that mandatory sanctions were now required. Whether the Soviet Union and China will agree to sanctions, such as an arms embargo, remains to be seen. Iran is a neighbour of the Soviet Union and the latter has been careful not to alienate the regime in Teheran.

In any event, sanctions would not be easy to enforce. According to a study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, over fifty countries are selling arms to Iraq and Iran, many of them to both countries and fifteen to Iran alone. In addition, arms are available from sources outside the control of governments. In these circumstances, it is uncertain how the UN would be able to enforce an arms

embargo; but the opportunity exists for the UN to play the role its founders anticipated if the Permanent Members can put aside their differences and work together.

Mr. Clark has strongly supported the efforts of the Secretary General to implement the Council's resolution, going so far as to promise "to put at their disposition any help that Canada might practically offer," and he has said that Canada would support the application of sanctions. Canada already applies an arms embargo against both countries, but the question of "definition" remains. Many so-called arms, such as parts for helicopters, can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Canada has apparently stopped the shipment of such parts to Iran, but the fact that they were so exported in 1986 suggests that the relevant Canadian legislation still needs to be clarified.

d) Afghanistan

If stalemate persisted between Iran and Iraq, so also did it persist inside Iran's neighbour, Afghanistan. The five million or so Afghan refugees continued to live in camps outside their borders; those inside continued for the most part to pursue guerilla warfare against the government in Kabul and its Soviet ally; the UN General Assembly again adopted a Resolution by an overwhelming majority (125-11-19) calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops; however, over 110,000 Soviet troops remained in place, despite continuing attempts to mediate the conflict by the UN Secretary-General. On the other hand, Mr. Gorbachev did confirm, during his visit to Washington in December, that Soviet troops would leave over a period of twelve months or less, if aid to the resistance forces also ceased and if a formula were found to create a government of "national reconciliation." At the end of the year, the UN Secretary-General's special representative was

actively seeking such a formula, perhaps to include the exiled king of Afghanistan. If he succeeds, a date might be set for beginning the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

Canada has made a significant contribution to the support of Afghan refugees in Pakistan (135 million dollars to date) and has spoken out strongly at the UN against Soviet occupation of the country; indeed, Stephen Lewis told the UN Assembly in October that Soviet withdrawal is "the pre-condition for peace." Canadian influence on Soviet policy can hardly be said to be significant--sanctions imposed in 1980 were lifted in 1986, exchanges have multiplied, and there is no Canadian programme of assistance to the Afghan resistance. But this impotence is also true of other countries, except for those who do actively help the resistance fighters or who, like the United States, are in a position to "link" regional settlements to other issues, such as arms control agreements. Even the Reagan Administration, however, has been unwilling to apply such a linkage in the case of the INF Agreement.

Two lessons are reasonably clear: armed intervention by outside powers in the affairs of others cannot succeed against popular opposition abetted by foreign support; and the ending of such intervention might best be achieved through a process of US/Soviet negotiation of "rules of behaviour" on a case by case basis. These might then form the basis of wider UN arrangements, perhaps linked to mechanisms for regional enforcement.

e) Other Areas of Conflict

The use of armed force to settle disputes appears to have somewhat decreased in other parts of the world, with one or two exceptions. The situation in Lebanon was more stable, although no nearer solution; the borders of Israel were

relatively calm, despite lack of agreement amongst the states concerned on the modalities of an international peace conference, and a serious outbreak of unrest in the occupied territories; the fighting between Vietnamese troops and their Kampuchean opponents on the border of Thailand was less active, and there were indications that the Kampuchean factions involved might be moving towards a settlement of their differences.

However, the dispatch of Indian troops to Sri Lanka in August to keep the peace between the Tamil minority and the government led to even greater violence, although the Indian army was in virtual control of the situation by the end of the year. In northern Africa rebellion in Ethiopia and conflict between Chad and Libya showed little sign of appeasement. Finally, the outlook in the Middle East will grow darker again if the situation of the Palestinians leads to further violence.

Western governments will need to consider carefully the relative weight to be given to "world order" assistance through the UN or otherwise, as compared to the tasks of "conventional" defence and the deterrence of East/ West conflict. If the pressures of population and growing social and economic disparities lead to more conflict in much of the world, middle powers like Canada would be especially suited to increase their support for international arrangements which prevent or diminish conflict, including the use of military personnel and generous development assistance. A hopeful sign is the new willingness which the Soviet Union seems to be showing to co-operate with the UN Secretary General and to revive the role of the Security Council.

4) Defence

As far as defence was concerned the highlight of 1987 was the release of the first White Paper in 16 years. It was followed by an NDP statement on defence policy and by a wide ranging public debate.

a) Canada's NATO Commitments

The Canadian Armed Force (CAF) have grappled for the better part of two decades with the problem that they cannot continue to carry out the traditional tasks assigned to them without major re-equipment programmes requiring large infusions of additional defence funds. These traditional tasks, particularly those most demanding in terms of equipment, training and expense, have been largely Alliance oriented: they include the commitment to maintain mechanized and air forces in Germany, anti-submarine warfare in the western Atlantic, and co-operation with the United States in the air defence of North America.

The Defence White Paper has reaffirmed these Alliance roles, with one important exception--Canada will abandon its commitment to send a reinforcement group to northern Norway in times of crisis. The military logic of this change is sound, but it would be unfortunate if it also weakened Canada's close diplomatic relations with Norway.

Given the extraordinarily high costs of modern aircraft, ships and armoured formations, it is entirely understandable that the White Paper stressed the need for additional funds for the re-equipment of the CAF. It is also understandable, given the relative neglect of the Navy in recent years, that in its planned acquisition programme the White Paper

emphasized maritime forces. More controversial, however, was the proposed purchase of ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) for operation in all three of Canada's oceans. Critics charged that SSNs would be too costly, consuming too high a proportion of defence resources; would involve Canada in the US Navy's controversial Maritime Strategy (intended to threaten Soviet missile submarines in their home waters); and would harm Canada's efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, by setting the unfortunate precedent of a non-nuclear weapon state acquiring nuclear technology for military purposes. Nevertheless, the Government maintained that nuclear propulsion so increases the capability of submarines as to make them more cost effective for the navy's traditional role of anti-submarine warfare, and that it would result in a more balanced fleet as between surface and sub-surface vessels.

Also questionable are the arguments about Soviet capacities and intentions that are used in the White Paper to justify such expenditures. At the least, these intentions now need to be re-appraised. The White Paper envisages an annual assessment of defence policy to be presented to Cabinet at the same time as the request for defence funding. An accompanying assessment of international political developments, and the implications of the defence funding programme for Canadian foreign policy, would be a valuable and desirable complement to such an annual defence review.

This may be all the more important because the costs of the Defence White Paper--which according to some estimates would require a 4-5 percent real annual increase in the defence budget over fifteen years--are unlikely to be granted in full, in which case major adjustments to the White Paper will be required in the years ahead.

The White Paper reaffirms Canada's willingness to continue maintaining land and air forces in Europe. There are good reasons for doing so, but it should not be thought that this is a commitment in perpetuity. As discussed above, the two alliances may soon begin serious discussions aimed at reducing the level of standing armies in Europe, and Canada will wish to play its part in those discussions. The larger objective is to maintain stability in Europe at lower levels of armament. If this objective is reached, we might well wish to re-examine our European commitments.

Interested organizations in Canada can make a valuable contribution by examining trends and issues which seem likely to appear, or reappear, on the broader political agenda. For example, are there plausible and desirable alternative European security systems which might succeed the present military alliances? What degree of de-nuclearization in Europe is militarily and politically feasible? How should Canadians understand current political developments in both Eastern and Western Europe? What would Canadians like to see happen in the next decade, and what role, if any, might Canada play in Europe if there is a substantial change in the relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

b) Security and Sovereignty in the Canadian North

Although nuclear submarines may, as claimed, be more effective than surface ships, given Canada's geography, the Government needs to provide a more adequate explanation of what it sees as the security problem faced by Canada in the Arctic. At the moment it seems clear that there is only a hypothetical Soviet presence in Canadian Arctic archipelagic waters, and an infrequent US presence. Whether this justifies a major diversion of defence resources is open to question,

particularly in view of the on-going superpower negotiations to reduce substantially their strategic arsenals.

In matters of sovereignty, the Government also needs to elaborate its intention to "maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago and to preserve Canada's sovereignty over land, sea and ice undiminished and undivided" (Clark, 10 September 1985). Canada has few, if any, supporters amongst the traditional maritime states and its major allies in NATO for our position on the North West Passage. In addition, the Nordic states are extremely conscious of Soviet claims in the North-East Passage, and will resist any strengthening of those claims. Canada may find therefore that its main support in this assertion of sovereignty comes from the Soviet Union. If the issue is to be taken to the International Court at some stage, Canada's presence in the area will need to be made clear.

In these circumstances, a case can be made that Canada ought to place less emphasis on sovereignty and more on the future of the Arctic region. This approach would include both a national strategy for development which would build on the measures announced by the Government in September 1985, and a multilateral strategy to address issues of peace and security in the Arctic. The zone of peace recently proposed by Mr. Gorbachev may not be acceptable to the Canadian and US governments, but the proposal does provide an opportunity to consider seriously the possibilities for restricting military activity in the Arctic. Generating international support for Canada's national objectives in the Arctic should be a priority task for the years ahead.

c) SDI and NORAD

The White Paper draws our attention to the active research programmes underway in the United States concerning the prospects of strategic defence both against the ballistic missile and against aircraft armed with cruise missiles. Canada participates in the latter. Although some degree of SDI research is prudent, the White Paper's implication that we should await the outcome of the research before taking a position on the possible contribution, if any, that Canada might make to SDI appears to overlook the main issue. This is that US/USSR agreement on the nature of this research will be essential if the current negotiations on strategic arms are to succeed.

It is true, as the White Paper asserts, that "Canada will still require a capacity to exercise effective surveillance and control over its air, land and sea space," whatever the outcome of SDI. Perhaps this surveillance will best be carried out by space-based radar systems, but if so the logic of geography will point towards co-operation with the United States, while the logic of politics may point in the opposite direction. It would make little sense to share strategic defence assets with the United States if these in turn were to impel the Soviet Union to increase the offensive threat they are designed to counter. As the Prime Minister put the matter in May 1987: "we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process."

d) Cruise Missile Testing

The air defence issue is complicated by the bilateral agreement to test the air-launched cruise missile. In February 1987 the Umbrella Testing Agreement was extended for

a further period of five years, but the Government has noted that this does not preclude withdrawal on twelve months notice, or even sooner should circumstances change. As the place of cruise missiles in the strategic arms talks becomes better defined, and if the United States requests agreement to test new types of advanced cruise missiles, it may well be appropriate to reappraise the Testing Agreement and clarify the circumstances in which Canadian co-operation is offered.

5) The Public Debate in Canada

There were many encouraging developments concerning the public discussion of issues of peace and security. Perhaps most importantly, media coverage of international issues was both more extensive and of a higher quality. The number of journalists assigned to postings in Moscow has increased significantly, thereby providing Canadians with reports on Soviet developments which are varied in political viewpoint, wide-ranging in their accounts of the changes taking place in Soviet society and politics, and which reflect Canadian interests. Reporting from Central America and from Africa has also contributed to Canadian discussion of issues in these parts of the world.

More difficult to assess is the health of the peace movement in Canada, and the changing nature of the debate about defence and disarmament. The absence of major demonstrations and other highly visible activities may not be the best indicator of public concern about security issues. Public concern remains high, with many Canadians still willing to contribute financially and volunteer their time to activities intended to demonstrate their concern for a more stable and secure future. Peace and security issues will only retain a high place on the political agenda if debate remains vigorous between those who believe that deterrence and a

balance of forces is the guarantee of peace, and those who believe that it leads to war.

Trends in Canadian public opinion are also difficult to judge. Most Canadians support Canada's traditional commitments to NATO and NORAD, but polls conducted by CIIPS also suggest that they believe the greatest threats to world peace are the arms race and nuclear proliferation rather than the policies of the USSR. Neither superpower is credited with being genuinely interested in measures of disarmament (this perception may well have changed since the Washington Summit).

On issues of particular interest in Canada, an overwhelming majority continue to support a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, and a majority of Canadians continue to be opposed to cruise missile testing. On the other hand, Canadians believe in an expanded Canadian defence force, in the strengthening of NATO, and in the need to maintain a military balance in Europe.

If these views persist they will challenge Canada's politicians to present policy alternatives which meaningfully reflect the views and dispositions of Canadians. In particular, they will want to note that in matters of nuclear arms, Canadians appear to attribute "moral equivalence" to the international behaviour of the two superpowers, despite harsh criticism of such attitudes in the US.

6) Conclusions

Canadians must accept that the shifts and movements of international politics are determined by forces largely beyond their control. But this is true of almost all countries, many of whom must envy Canada's relative security and prosperity. They look to Canada to speak out on major global issues. The

question of how to use such influence as we have is an underlying theme of this report. Moreover, there are issues in which we have a preponderant interest, such as the degradation of the environment and the future of the Arctic, where we have no choice but to lead the way.

In superpower arms control, the Government has played its part within the Alliance in encouraging the United States to pursue deep reductions in strategic weapons while staying within the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This policy will become even more important in 1988 as the prospects for deep reductions come to depend on a resolution of the dispute about permissible research and the development of strategic defences. Furthermore, Canada will continue to face, perhaps more acutely, the implications of its particular involvement with strategic cruise missiles. How to find a balance between co-operating with the United States in the defence of North America against the cruise missile threat, while seeking to encourage limits on cruise missile deployments by both superpowers, is a task which the Government has not fully addressed: in 1988 Canadians must hope to have a clearer accounting of the problem, and of the Canadian approach.

In other areas of arms control, such as chemical weapons and conventional force reductions, we are well placed to take maximum advantage of the breakthroughs achieved in the INF Treaty. The stringent requirements for verification agreed to in the Treaty more than justify the emphasis which Canada has placed on verification research in the past. Opportunities now exist to take advantage of the Soviet promises of a more flexible stance, and to renew initiatives for multilateral verification procedures in chemical weapons, in nuclear test ban negotiations, and in European force reductions.

Conversely, the experience with regional conflicts in 1987 indicates once again the intractable nature of many of these conflicts, and the danger that they will spark larger conflagrations. Canada's contribution is best made by working with other states, but a Canadian lead to make the UN more effective in regional conflict resolution is one which has a traditional appeal to Canadians; the opportunity will present itself if Canada is elected to the Security Council at the next session of the Assembly.

Finally, the Defence White Paper has charted a course for the revitalization of the Canadian Armed Forces. While this appears to be supported by Canadians, there are two outstanding problems which will need to be faced in 1988. First, the programme is ambitious, and the Department of National Defence must face the dilemma of what to do if the funds required are not forthcoming. Second, security in the Arctic is an issue which cannot be settled by purely military means. Canada needs a more comprehensive approach to its North which includes circumpolar co-operation, and offers a Canadian vision of a peaceful Arctic.

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